GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works

Faculty Scholarship

2010

Same-Sex Family Equality and Religious Freedom
Ira C. Lupu
George Washington University Law School

Robert W. Tuttle
George Washington University Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/faculty_publications
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Same-Sex Family Equality and Religious Freedom, 5 NW J. L. & Soc. Pol'y
274 (2010).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarly Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works by an authorized administrator of
Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact spagel@law.gwu.edu.

SAME-SEX FAMILY EQUALITY AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle 1
In the spring of 2009, a seismic shift – both institutional and substantive – occurred in the
fight over legal recognition of same-sex marriage. The institutional venue for the conflict
changed as legislatures replaced courts as the primary decision-makers on the issue. Within a
period of eight weeks, the legislatures of four states – Vermont, Connecticut, Maine, and New
Hampshire – enacted legislation to recognize same-sex marriage. 2 Although the legality of
same-sex marriage in the United States traces back to the pioneering decision in 2003 by the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 3 and
several additional states have legalized same-sex marriage through judicial decision,4 these
1
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The texts of the relevant statutes appear in notes to part II, infra.
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798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). Prior to the Massachusetts Supreme Court decision, a

Vermont Supreme Court decision led to the creation of civil unions. See Baker v. State, 744
A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
4

See Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008); Varnum v. Brien,
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legislative measures were the first of their kind in the U.S. Moreover, among these states, only
Connecticut was under court order to recognize such marriages. Legislatures in the other three
states were acting without any such pressure from the state’s judicial branch.
The substantive quality of the shift involves the role of religion. All four legislative
enactments include provisions designed to respect the liberty of religious communities to
maintain their own teaching and practices on this subject. Each state’s legislation explicitly
guarantees the rights of clergy to decide whether to preside at same-sex marriages, and the rights
of houses of worship to decide whether to make their facilities available to solemnize or
celebrate a same-sex wedding. As will be discussed below, a few states go further, by protecting
the rights of religiously affiliated organizations to refuse to treat same-sex marriages equally
with opposite-sex marriages. Despite some academic prodding, however, no state has yet been
willing to grant to public officials or vendors of goods and services related to weddings –
photographers, caterers, wedding planners, florists, and the like – exemptions from state-created
obligations to serve without discrimination based on sexual orientation or the same-sex character
of the event.
The conflict between state recognition of same-sex families and religious concerns is not
new, and it is not limited to the United States. In June of 2009, a tribunal in the UK ruled that a
Catholic adoption agency’s refusal to place children with same-sex couples violated the
763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009); In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008). The California
ruling in In re Marriage Cases has since been superceded by the passing of Proposition 8,
amending the California State Constitution to exclude same-sex couples from marriage. See
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5
2
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governing regulations for the provision of adoption services. 5 In recent and widely reported
cases in the U.S., a wedding photographer in New Mexico became the target of legal action
when she refused to provide photography services at a same-sex wedding ceremony, 6 and a New
Jersey Civil Rights Commission ruled that the state’s public accommodation law prohibited a
Methodist organization that operated a boardwalk pavilion, held open for events by people of all
faiths, from excluding a same-sex commitment ceremony. 7
5

In the Matter of an Appeal to the Charity Tribunal between Catholic Care (Diocese of

Leeds) and The Charity Commission for England and Wales, available at
http://www.charity.tribunals.gov.uk/documents/decisions/CatholicCareDecision_1609v2.pdf.
See also Nichols v. Saskatchewan Human Rights Comm’n, 2009 Sk. Q. B. 299 (2009)
(provincial marriage commissioner may be fined for refusing to perform same-sex marriage).
Commissioner Nichols could have limited his commission to the performance of marriages for
those within his own faith, but he had not done so.
6

See Elane Photography v. Willock, No. D-202-CV-200806632 (N.M. 2d Jud. Dist. Ct.)

(filed June 30, 2008) (imposing a fine on photographer for refusing on religious grounds to
photograph a same-sex marriage ceremony).
7

Bernstein v.Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Ass'n, No. PN34XB-03008 (N.J. Dep't. of

Law and Public Safety, Notice of Probable Cause issued Dec. 29, 2008), available at
http://www.nj.gov/oag/newsreleases08/pr20081229a-Bernstein-v-OGCMA.pdf. Applying
abstention principles, the federal courts have refused to enjoin the proceeding. Ocean Grove
Camp Meeting Ass'n v. Vespa-Papaleo, 2007 WL 3349787 (D.N.J. 2007), aff’d 2009 U.S. App.
LEXIS 15741 (3d Cir.,7/15/09).
3

As these examples show, the conflict between gay equality and religious freedom is not
restricted to disputes over the legality of same-sex marriage – neither the UK, nor New Mexico,
nor New Jersey licenses such marriages within its borders. Nevertheless, as the number of
nations and states permitting such marriage increases, 8 disputes involving religiously affiliated
institutions and vendors in industries related to marriage are likely to appear with increasing
frequency in many jurisdictions, in the U.S. and elsewhere.
A small but important academic literature exists on the potential conflicts between samesex family formation and religious liberty. The earliest contributions to this debate typically
asserted a wide variety of threats to religious liberty from the same-sex marriage movement, and
implicitly relied on this bundle of threats to make a case against state recognition of same-sex
marriages. 9
More recently, however, a different category of academic appraisal has begun to appear.
These writings focus on the need to shield religious liberty from the social and legal
8

In addition to the six states in the U.S. that license same-sex marriages, such marriages

are legally authorized in Belgium, Canada, the Netherlands, Norway, South Africa, Spain, and
Sweden. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Same-sex_marriage.
9

George W. Dent, Jr., Civil Rights for Whom? Gay Rights vs. Religious Freedom, 95

Ky. L. J. 553 (2007); Roger Severino, Or for Poorer? How Same-Sex Marriage Threatens
Religious Liberty, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 939 (2007); Thomas M. Messner, Same-Sex
Marriage and the Threat to Religious Liberty, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY BACKGROUNDER
No. 2201 (published by The Heritage Foundation, October 30, 2008), available at
http://www.heritage.org/research/Family/upload/bg_2201.pdf.
4

consequences that might follow from recognition of same-sex marriage. 10 That is, these
commentaries advocate some form of modus vivendi between those who support same-sex
marriage and those who seek to protect the freedom of religious individuals and institutions to
refrain from assisting such marriages or to oppose homosexual relationships more generally.
Now that a number of state legislatures have addressed this conflict, the time is especially
ripe for a new assessment of the various forms this modus vivendi might take. Part I of this piece
explores the social and legal dynamics of conflict between advocates of gay equality, including
marriage equality, and advocates of a religiously-based freedom to oppose the morality and
social legitimacy of an openly gay life. Part II develops and analyzes a typology of these
conflicts. In Part II.A., we offer arguments to buttress the freedom of clergy and communities of
worship to refuse to lend their support to the solemnization and celebration of same-sex
marriage. Part II.B. turns to the context in which advocates of religious liberty have had the least
success, and in which arguments for exemptions seem least persuasive – the claims of religiously
motivated individuals (not employed by religious organizations) to be free of obligations not to
discriminate based on sexual orientation or the same-sex quality of a relationship. Part II.C.
focuses on what we think are the most difficult issues – whether religiously affiliated
organizations, such as charities and educational institutions, should be exempt from non10

See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, You Can't Hurry Love: Why Antidiscrimination

Protections for Gay People Should Have Religious Exemptions, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 125
(2006). Douglas Laycock and Robin Wilson, eds, Same-Sex Marriage and Religious Liberty
(Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 2008) (hereinafter cited as “Same-Sex Marriage and
Religious Liberty”).
5

discrimination rules with respect to the status of marriage. Here, we identify the leading
policy concerns that should be relevant to legislatures in deciding whether to exempt
religious organizations from rules prohibiting discrimination against same-sex couples.
In light of these considerations, we sketch an over-arching approach to schemes of
legislative exemption in the context of goods and services incident to weddings, more
general services provided to married couples, and employee benefits.
I. Framing the Conflict
The American partnership between civil and religious institutions over marriage is
longstanding. States have recognized the convenience and social authority that derives
from permitting clergy to preside over marriages that have both religious and civil
significance. In addition, all states provide that public officers, such as state court judges,
local justices of the peace, or court clerks may preside at marriage ceremonies. 11
Moreover, many church-originated doctrines with respect to prohibited marriages (i.e.,
underage, bigamous, and incestuous, among others), divorce, and other issues relating to
marriage were absorbed first into the common law and then into the relevant statutory
law of the American states. 12
As family law in America became modernized in the second half of the 20th
century, the substantive criteria that governed divorce became increasingly distant from
the criteria that operated within many religious communities, especially those with
11

In Maryland, for example, justices of the peace could originally perform
marriages, but now have been replaced in those duties by clerks of the circuit courts. See
http://usmarriagelaws.com/search/united_states/maryland/index.shtml.
12

See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164-165 (1878) (describing
reception of ecclesiastical prohibition on plural marriage into common law and statutory
law of England, and then U.S. colonies and states).
6

traditional views of marriage. In particular, civil divorce law moved sharply away from
the norms of the Roman Catholic, Orthodox Jewish, Mormon, and other conservative
religious communities. Nevertheless, for reasons of custom, convenience, and religious
freedom – including the freedom to marry without any religious vows, symbols, or
commitment – American practices continued to recognize the simultaneous availability of
pure civil marriage, administered by a public official, and joint civil-religious marriage,
typically administered by a member of the clergy and governed by state laws.
Because marriage, far more than divorce, remained fixed in the minds of many as
a joint venture between religious communities and the state, it is no great surprise that the
same-sex marriage movement set off a storm of protest from traditional religious
quarters. 13 The response to the first hints of legalized same-sex marriage in the 1990's, 14
amplified loudly by the more pervasive and powerful response to the Goodridge decision
in Massachusetts in 2003, was a flurry of opposition that gathered under the cultural and
legal rubric of “the defense of marriage.” 15 Thus, until very recently, the conservative

13

See Mary Anne Case, How Same-Sex Marriage Threatens Evangelical
Protestant Marriage, in the Immanent Frame and the Future of Marriage (SSRC 2008).
14

In Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993), the Hawaii Supreme Court had
appeared to pave the way for same-sex marriage in that state, but the state amended its
Constitution to bar same-sex marriage before the litigation concluded. The story of the
political reaction to Baehr is well-summarized in William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Nan D.
Hunter, Sexuality, Gender, and the Law (Foundation Press, 2d ed. 2004) 1076-1080
(hereafter cited as Eskridge & Hunter).
15

See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Darren R. Spedale, Gay Marriage: For Better or
for Worse? 26-29 (Oxford University Press 2006) (discussing the passing of the 1996
Federal Defense of Marriage Act). After Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 798
N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003), many states also scrambled to enact state constitutional
amendments designed to protect against similar state court decisions, Eskridge &
Spedale, supra, at 41. See generally An Overview
7 of the Same-Sex Marriage Debate,

religious response to the movement for same-sex marriage was the assertion, as a sword
against that movement, of a religious understanding of marriage as a male-female bond.
As time went on, however, it became increasingly difficult to persuade moderate
voters that religious opposition to same-sex marriage required legal prohibition of such
marriage. By political necessity, in the fight over Proposition 8 in California, the
religion-based arguments took a new turn. Opponents of same-sex marriage argued that
if such unions were recognized by the state, as they had been at that point by the
California Supreme Court, 16 religious communities would be coerced through a variety
of means into accepting the legitimacy of such marriages. If these arguments were right,
continued recognition of same-sex marriage would become a zero-sum game. The gains
for same-sex families would come at the direct expense of religious communities that
refused to accept the legal legitimacy of those families.
In the heated political struggle over Prop 8, these assertions came to the forefront.
To the extent voters believed that the freedom of their own religious leaders to preach as
they chose on matters of sexuality and family, and the freedom of their own faith
communities to accept or reject particular family arrangements, were at stake in the
outcome, the voters were that much more likely to vote for Prop 8. Exit polls conducted
on Election Day in 2008 suggested that those arguments had indeed influenced the
outcome. 17

Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, available at
http://pewforum.org/docs/?DocID=288.
16
17

In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008).

See Martin Wisckol, Gay Marriage Advocates Bristle at Religion's Role in
Prop. 8 win, ORANGE CTY. REG., Dec. 5, 2008,
8 available at

This reframing of the debate between traditional religious concerns and
proponents of same-sex marriage, however, carried within it the seeds of a new and
powerful reconciliation of competing interests. If opponents of same sex marriage
believe that the practice is inherently sinful and destructive to the community, then
compromise is very unlikely. But if opponents are primarily concerned about the loss of
religious freedom for faith communities that do not accept same-sex marriage, then
provision of assurances about protecting that freedom might well soften the opposition
and pave the way to a modus vivendi between opposing sides. 18 What form might such a
modus vivendi take?
II. Same-Sex Partners and Religious Freedom – A Typology of Conflict
In this part, we explore a variety of ways that same-sex marriage might collide
with the religious liberty of institutions and individuals. We identify the relevant legal
parameters for analyzing those conflicts, and evaluate legislative measures for
ameliorating them.
One case, Bernstein v. Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Association, 19 provides an
http://www.ocregister.com/articles/religious-church-campaign-2247442-state-gay; see
also Exit Polls, California Proposition 8: Ban on Gay Marriage, available at
http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2008/results/polls/#CAI01p1 (last visited July 8, 2009).
18

See Blankenhorn & Rauch, Op-Ed, A Reconciliation on Gay Marriage, N.Y
TIMES, Feb. 21, 2009, at WK11, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/22/opinion/22rauch.html.
19

Bernstein v.Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Ass'n, No. PN34XB-03008 (N.J.
Dep't. of Law and Public Safety, Notice of Probable Cause issued Dec. 29, 2008),
available at http://www.nj.gov/oag/newsreleases08/pr20081229a-Bernstein-vOGCMA.pdf. A federal district court refused, on abstention grounds, to enjoin the
proceeding. Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Ass'n v. Vespa-Papaleo, 2007 WL 3349787
(D.N.J. 2007), affirmed 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 15741 (3rd Cir. 7/15/09).
9

especially illuminating context for exploring the conflict. Ocean Grove Camp Meeting
Association (OGCMA) is a Methodist ministry organization that owns Ocean Grove,
N.J., an unincorporated beach front community. OGCMA was formed in the late 19th
century as a place for religious revivals, known as “tent meetings,” and summer vacations
in a Christian environment. 20 The Association subdivided the property, and conveyed
residential and commercial lots subject to 99 year renewable leases.21 OGCMA retained
possession over the common areas, including places for worship and assembly, the
boardwalk, and the beach. 22 Over the past century, OGCMA has maintained a vibrant
ministry in the community, with worship and other religious activities at the core of the
summer events.
In 2007, Harriet Bernstein and Luisa Paster, a lesbian couple who reside in Ocean
Grove, asked to reserve the Boardwalk Pavilion 23 for their civil union commitment
ceremony. OGCMA denied the request, explaining that the proposed use was

20

Morris S. Daniels, The Story of Ocean Grove: Related in the Year of Its Golden
Jubilee 1869-1919 (New York: The Methodist Book Concern, 1919), 23-42, available at:
http://books.google.com/books?id=sQwWAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA263&dq=Ocean+Grove
&as_brr=1. See also State of New Jersey v. Celmer, 80 N.J. 405, 410-412 (1979).
21

Celmer, 80 N.J. at 410-412.
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Bernstein v.Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Ass'n, No. PN34XB-03008 (N.J.
Dep't. of Law and Public Safety, Notice of Probable Cause issued Dec. 29, 2008), at 2-3,
available at http://www.nj.gov/oag/newsreleases08/pr20081229a-Bernstein-vOGCMA.pdf.
23

As described in the decision of the New Jersey Division for Civil Rights, “the
Boardwalk Pavilion is a rectangular open-sided structure covered by a roof. It contains
fixed wooden benches facing a small raised area usable as a stage. The benches also face
the beach and ocean.” Id. at 3.
10

inconsistent with church teaching that does not recognize same-sex marriage. 24 The
couple filed a complaint with the state, alleging that the denial violated the New Jersey
Law Against Discrimination (LAD). The state found probable cause to proceed with the
investigation, ruling that the Boardwalk Pavilion was a “place of public accommodation”
under LAD, and that OGCMA had impermissibly denied complainants access to the
Pavilion because of their sexual orientation. 25 In the wake of the complaint, a different
state agency revoked OGCMA’s property tax exemption for the parcel containing the
Boardwalk Pavilion. 26
For those concerned about recognition of same-sex marriage, the OGCMA case
represents the first wave of an assault on religious liberty. 27 Told from that perspective,
this is a story of a religious ministry forced to open its place of worship, where regular
worship services and daily religious education events are held, for use in a ceremony that
the religious community believes is sinful, with civil liability and loss of tax benefits as
the penalty for refusal.
Closer examination of the OGCMA case reveals a more complicated story. First,
Ocean Grove functions as a diverse town, not simply a religious ministry. Second,

24

Id. at 5.

25

OCGMA filed suit in federal district court to enjoin the state's proceeding under
LAD, arguing that imposition of LAD violated the Association's constitutional rights.
The district court dismissed the suit, Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Ass'n v. VespaPapaleo, 2007 WL 3349787 (D.N.J. 2007), and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit affirmed, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 15741 (3rd Cir. 7/15/09).
26

Bernstein v.Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Ass'n, No. PN34XB-03008 (N.J.
Dep't. of Law and Public Safety, Notice of Probable Cause issued Dec. 29, 2008), at 6.
27

Wilson, supra note XX, at 78; Messner, supra note XX, at 9.
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OGCMA obtained public funding and a special property tax exemption for the
Boardwalk Pavilion site based on a representation that the property would be open to the
general public, rather than restricted to use by the religious group. 28 The advantageous
property tax treatment was not a function of OGCMA’s religious status, but rather a
result of its promise not to develop the property and to provide open public access to the
site.
Third, until it denied the request from Bernstein and Paster, OGCMA consistently
treated the boardwalk and Pavilion as public space. OGCMA accepted secular and
religious reservations, subject to payment of a standard fee, and when not reserved the
Pavilion was open for all to use.29 OGCMA displayed no signs indicating that the
boardwalk or Pavilion were private property.
The OGCMA case highlights the crucial distinction between public and private
realms. The distinction reflects widely shared and legally embodied beliefs about the
exercise of authority by individuals, intermediate associations, and state institutions. On
the private side, the political community has only a limited authority to regulate the
bonds of intimacy and association. 30 Various reasons can be given for this limit,
including the relationship between privacy and personal flourishing, the role of
independent associations in the development and preservation of liberal political order,

28

Bernstein v. Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Ass’n, note xx supra, at 4-6. For
more detail on the Green Acres tax exemption, see Real Property Taxation of Recreation
and Conservation Lands Owned by Nonprofit Organizations, N.J.A.C. 7:35.
29
30

Bernstein v. Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Ass’n, note xx supra, at 3-4.

See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965); Lawrence, 539
U.S. at 584-85; Dale, 530 U.S at 655-656.
12

the value of pluralism in belief and expression, and the recognition that unfettered public
control over private life has historically led to dire abuses. 31 But we also recognize that
the political community has a legitimate interest in ensuring that all people have equal
access to publicly available goods and services, whether provided by the state or by
commercial entities. This interest primarily arises from concern about those who are
excluded from such benefits. Exclusion may imperil health and safety, limit
opportunities for personal development, deny political and social equality, or impose
psychic distress. State policies protecting against such exclusion also express the
political community’s concerns about its own character and experience, because such
exclusion may result in segregation and conflict.
The OGCMA case tests our intuitions about how to reconcile these competing
interests and concerns. On the one hand, OGCMA regards the Boardwalk Pavilion as a
place of worship, and believes that celebration of a same-sex union in that space would
be offensive to its religious commitments. On the other hand, Bernstein and Paster see
the Pavilion as part of their town, a facility enjoyed by all and available, by reservation
and payment of a fee, to celebrate significant events. At first glance, the case seems to
reflect an irreducible clash of sensibilities. Someone will have deeply felt beliefs and
expectations disappointed; the best law can do is to attempt to resolve the dispute in the
manner that causes the least damage. But a comparative assessment of subjective
experiences cannot produce a reliable and principled method for resolving these disputes.
Decision-makers are likely to favor whichever beliefs they happen to share, and in any
event it is difficult to measure the extent of an individual’s or an institution’s sincere
31

See Jed Rubenfeld, The Right to Privacy, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 737 (1989).
13

attachment to a particular belief.
Instead of focusing on the subjective experiences of those involved in such
conflicts, both law and policy should attend to objective characteristics that lead to
principled decisions and better reflect the interests at stake. Under the New Jersey Law
Against Discrimination, a facility or activity that is “private” has no obligation to comply
with non-discrimination rules, but a “place of public accommodation” must comply, and
may only exclude for good – non-discriminatory – reasons. 32 The distinction between
public and private focuses on the scope of invitation and the character of the use. The
OGCMA extended a broad invitation to use the Pavilion, on a casual basis for anyone
visiting the boardwalk, and by reservation for anyone willing to pay the fee. Although
the Association held worship events in the Pavilion, the facility was also used for events
that had no religious connection, including secular weddings. Moreover, the dispute
arose in the context of an already blurred line between religious and civil community,
analogous to the situation in other privately-owned towns, where expectations of
individual civil liberties are protected even on private lands. 33 And most importantly,
OGCMA expressly promised, as a condition of receiving its Green Acres tax exemption,
that the public would have equal access to the property.
While treatment of the Pavilion as a public accommodation might offend the
religious sensibilities of OGCMA, the Pavilion’s character as a public accommodation
32
33

New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 et. seq.

See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509-10 (1946) (holding that a private,
company-owned town could not circumscribe the free speech rights of individuals within
its borders); NJ Coalition Against the War v. J.M.B Realty, 650 A.2d 757, 780 (N.J.
1994) (holding that the free speech rights of citizens could be exercised within a privately
owned mall).
14

distanced OGCMA from an expressive affiliation with particular uses of the facility. If
the Pavilion had been available only for worship or other events connected with the
Association’s religious ministry, then OGCMA would have had a stronger claim that
forced inclusion of the same-sex ceremony intruded on their legitimate expectations for
the space. But if OGCMA had not been selective with respect to other uses of the
Pavilion, and had not been a visible co-sponsor of all prior events, OGCMA cannot
reasonably be perceived as endorsing the same-sex ceremony. Bernstein and Paster did
not ask OGCMA to furnish a minister to officiate at their ceremony, or to publicize the
ceremony in the Association’s newsletter, or in any other way to participate in the event.
Of course, OGCMA had – and indeed eventually exercised – the power to withdraw the
Pavilion from public use by refusing all reservations of the space, or by adopting
religiously selective criteria for its use. 34 But, taken alone, the decision to exclude
Bernstein and Paster did not convert the Pavilion into a private space.
This public-private divide can be traced into the three settings that we examine
below. These include the right of clergy and religious communities to choose which
marriages to solemnize; the rights of religiously motivated individuals who oppose samesex marriage to refuse to facilitate it; and the rights of religious organizations to

34

Following the decision to deny Bernstein and Paster’s request to use the
Pavilion, OGCMA changed its policy on use of the facility. It ended the practice of
allowing people to reserve the Pavilion for weddings. Bernstein v. Ocean Grove Camp
Meeting Ass'n, note xx supra, at 5-6. After that change in policy, another lesbian couple,
Janice Moore and Emily Sonnessa, attempted to reserve the Pavilion for a commitment
ceremony, and OGCMA again denied the request. However, when Moore and Sonnessa
complained to the state civil rights division, the state found no probable cause to further
pursue their allegations. Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Ass’n v. Vespa-Papaleo, 2009 U.S.
App. LEXIS 15741 (3rd Cir. 7/15/09).
15

determine the status incidents of family life.
A. The Rights of Clergy and Religious Communities to Choose which Marriages
to Solemnize.
The debate over Prop 8 in California included assertions that clergy and faith
communities would be forced against their will to solemnize same-sex marriages.35
However constitutionally or politically implausible those claims may have been, they
gained some traction with voters. Although such a coercive policy is politically
inconceivable, the government could treat the celebration of marriage as a public
accommodation, and prohibit discrimination by providers of that service. Or, the
government could impose a condition on its grant of the authority to solemnize
marriages, requiring the celebrant to be willing to serve all couples. In response to fears
of this character, the four states that have now enacted same-sex marriage legislation
have provided explicit assurances that neither clergy nor religious communities will be
forced to cooperate in these ways. For example, Section 7(a) of the Connecticut law
provides that “No member of the clergy authorized [by state law] to join persons in
marriage . . . shall be required to solemnize any marriage in violation of his or her right to
the free exercise of religion [as guaranteed by the federal and state constitutions].” 36 And
Section 7(b) of the Connecticut law provides that “No church or qualified church-

35

See e.g., The New American Foundation, The Blockbuster Democracy Blog,
http://www.newamerica.net/blog/blockbuster-democracy/2009/prop-8-decision-wordand-question-12046.
36

Connecticut Public Act No. 09-13, “An Act Implementing the Guarantee of
Equal Protection under the Constitution of the State for Same-Sex Couples,” Sec. 7 (a)
(signed into law on April 23, 2009), available at
http://www.cga.ct.gov/2009/ACT/PA/2009PA-00013-R00SB-00899-PA.htm.
16

controlled organization . . . shall be required to participate in a ceremony solemnizing a
marriage in violation of the religious beliefs of the church or qualified church-controlled
organization.” 37 The recent same-sex marriage legislation in Vermont,38 Maine, 39 and
New Hampshire 40 all contain similar provisions concerning the freedoms of clergy and
37

Id., Sec. 7 (b). The law also exempts any religiously affiliated organization
from any obligation “to provide services, accommodations, advantage[s], facilities, goods
or privileges to an individual if the request for such services is related to the
solemnization of a marriage or celebration of a marriage and such solemnization or
celebration is in violation of [the organization’s] religious beliefs and faith.” Id., sec. 17.
In Part II. C., below, we discuss this broader exemption in section 17.
38

Section 9 of the recently enacted Vermont legislation (“An Act to Protect
Religious Freedom and Recognize Equality in Civil Marriage”) provides in part: “This
section does not require a member of the clergy or [any religious society] to solemnize
any [particular] marriage,” (amending 18 V.S.A. sec. 5144). Section 11 of the Act
provides in part: “ . . . a religious organization . . or a [religiously affiliated] organization
shall not be required to provide services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods
or privileges to an individual if the request for such services, accommodations,
advantages, facilities, goods or privileges is related to the solemnization of a marriage or
celebration of a marriage.”
39

Maine, “An Act to End Discrimination in Civil Marriage and Affirm Religious
Freedom,” Section 5: “19-A MRSA §655, sub-§3 (available at
http://www.mainelegislature.org/legis/bills/bills_124th/chappdfs/PUBLIC82.pdf) is
enacted to read: “3. Affirmation of Religious Freedom. This Part does not authorize any
court or other state or local governmental body, entity, agency or commission to compel,
prevent or interfere in any way with any religious institution’s religious doctrine, policy,
teaching or solemnization of marriage within that particular religious faith’s tradition as
guaranteed by the Maine Constitution, Article 1, Section 3, or the First Amendment of
the United States Constitution. A person authorized to join persons in marriage and who
fails or refuses to join persons in marriage is not subject to any fine or other penalty for
such failure or refusal.”(signed into law on 5/6/09)
40

. The New Hampshire law, An Act Affirming Religious Freedom Protections
with Regard to Marriage, secs. III, available at
http://www.gencourt.state.nh.us/legislation/2009/HB0073.html, includes the following
provision: “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a religious organization,
association, or society, or any individual who is17
managed, directed, or supervised by or in

religious communities.
It is the common intuition of lawyers and scholars that the First Amendment, as
well as state constitutional guarantees, protect these categories of religious freedom, but
there has thus far been little explanation of why this is so. It will be much easier to
analyze other, less muscular claims of religious liberty if we explain the conventional
wisdom that neither clergy nor faith communities can be directly coerced into celebrating
weddings for anyone, same-sex couples included.
The idea that clergy are agents of the state, authorized to solemnize civil
marriage, and therefore subject to considerable state control, is deeply inconsistent with a
core aspect of religious liberty. The state’s power with respect to the role and identity of
clergy is, and long has been, extremely limited. In colonial America, some states
licensed clergy, and therefore exercised precisely this sort of control over which clergy –
and which faiths – could solemnize a marriage. 41 One of the central purposes of the

conjunction with a religious organization, association or society, or any nonprofit
institution or organization operated, supervised, or controlled by or in conjunction with a
religious organization, association or society, shall not be required to provide services,
accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods or privileges to an individual if such
request for such services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods or privileges is
related to the solemnization of a marriage, the celebration of a marriage, or the promotion
of marriage through religious counseling, programs, courses, retreats, or housing
designated for married individuals, and such solemnization, celebration, or promotion of
marriage is in violation of their religious belief and faith.” (HB 73). The New Hampshire
law also contains the following provision relating to clergy: “Members of the clergy as
described in RSA 457:31 or other persons otherwise authorized under law to solemnize a
marriage shall not be obligated or otherwise required by law to officiate at any particular
civil marriage or religious rite of marriage in violation of their right to free exercise of
religion protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution or by part I,
article 5 of the New Hampshire constitution.”
41

Thomas J. Curry, The First Freedoms:18
Church and State to the Passage of the

religious liberty provisions in the First Amendment was to eliminate governmental
control over the clergy. 42 This understanding is reflected in modern decisions like
McDaniel v. Paty, 43 in which the Supreme Court invalidated a statute that disabled clergy
from serving in a state legislature, as well as in Locke v. Davey, 44 in which the Court
upheld an exclusion of clergy training from a state scholarship program. This insulation
of clergy from both controls and support normally attached to other learned professions is
also reflected in common law decisions rejecting the concept of clergy malpractice. 45 In
addition, the “ministerial exception” bars judicial review of a wide range of legal issues
arising from the employment relationship between clergy and religious communities. 46
Thus, across a broad range of legal contexts, our constitutional tradition recognizes a very
strong policy that the state keep its hands off the selection, training, and role of the
clergy. These matters are constitutionally committed to the exclusive jurisdiction of
communities of faith.
Accordingly, the state may not require those ordained by faith communities as
clergy to lend their imprimatur or participation to any social function, matrimonial or

First Amendment xx (1986).
42

Id. at xx.
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435 U.S. 618 (1978).
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540 U.S. 712 (2004).
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Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley, 763 P.2d 948 (Calif. 1988)..
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McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972). For discussion of
the ways in which the ministerial exception has become very widespread, see Ira C. Lupu
& Robert W. Tuttle, Courts, Clergy, and Congregations: Disputes between Religious
Institutions and their Leaders, 7 Geo. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 119 (2009).
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otherwise. The state may strip the clergy of the power to solemnize civil marriage, 47
though such a move would cause great inconvenience and enormous howls of protest.
But the state cannot commandeer the clergy in the state’s efforts to gain social approval
for a particular form of marriage, be it inter-faith, inter-racial, same-sex, or otherwise. In
this context, as in many others, the First Amendment operates as a separation of powers
provision, remitting the question of who may be entitled to religious marriage entirely to
the judgment of clergy and the faith communities they represent. 48
Moreover, if the relevant religious community has norms with respect to who may
marry within its traditions – and virtually all traditions have such norms – the state is
disabled from substituting its judgment for that of the faith community on the content of
those religious norms. Imagine, for example, a state policy that required religious
communities to celebrate a marriage if “at least one partner to the marriage belonged to
the faith.” Such a requirement would substantially hamper a faith’s ability to determine
its own membership and to define the religious significance of participation in its
sacraments.
Put more generally, a proposition crucial to religious liberty is that religions, to
maintain their integrity, must and do discriminate. They may do so based on ancestry, on
professed belief, on participation in ritual, and on behavioral fidelity to religious norms.
State interference with these forms of selectivity cannot possibly be consistent with the

47

Laycock, Afterword, supra note XX, at 201-207 (proposing bifurcation of civil
and religious marriage).
48

For a similar conception of the role of the Religion Clauses in separating
private from governmental power, see Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a
Structural Restraint on Governmental Power, 84 Iowa L. Rev. 1 (1998).
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free exercise of religion.
Boy Scouts of America v. Dale 49 suggests that more general principles of freedom
of association similarly support provisions of this character. The Boy Scouts and other
non-commercial voluntary associations also represent normative communities, and they
are entitled to exclude from membership or leadership those who do not share their
beliefs. The lesson of Dale is that non-discrimination laws may not constitutionally
trump the freedom to form and maintain such associations, however divergent from the
mainstream their views may be. Like the OGCMA case, Dale arose from a complaint,
brought under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, alleging that a public
accommodation engaged in discrimination based on sexual orientation. The difference
between Dale and OGCMA is telling. In Dale, the complainant sought a position of
leadership, in which he would represent the Boy Scouts through guiding the character
formation of members and facilitating relations with the general public. In OGCMA,
however, Bernstein and Paster asked to use a facility that was not specifically identified
with Methodist worship, that ordinary observers would see as public space, and that had
been available for rental by anyone willing to pay the fee. Dale was asking for the Boy
Scouts’ blessing; Bernstein and Paster were asking for equal access to public space.
These differences suggest an important limit on the reach of both Dale and
OGCMA. The ruling in Dale applies only to the expressive activities of non-commercial
entities. 50 Commercial entities do not enjoy the same protected interest in associational

49
50

530 U.S. 640 (2000).

For the expression of related principles, see Corp. of Presiding Bishop v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 340-346 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring) (Title VII exemption for
religious organizations to engage in religion-based
21 hiring should not extend to for-profit

freedom, in part because sellers have no legitimate reason for treating customers as
anything other than fungible, and in part because protection of associational freedom for
commercial actors would systematically trump civil rights laws. Similarly, the result in
OGCMA would have been different if OGCMA had not treated the Boardwalk Pavilion
as publicly available space. By adopting a more restrictive policy on use of the Pavilion,
OGCMA could have demonstrated that control over the facility served important and
legitimate expressive purposes. 51
B. Accommodation of Religiously Motivated Individuals Opposed to Same-Sex
Families
Some commentators have argued that the law should accommodate the religious
concerns of individuals who object on religious grounds to same-sex marriage, and
whose jobs or livelihoods would require them to facilitate such a marriage in some way. 52
For example, Professors Robin Fretwell Wilson and Douglas Laycock have defended the
notion that public employees such as marriage license clerks, and private vendors in the
wedding industry should be afforded a “right . . . to refuse to facilitate same-sex
entities); Sports & Health Club, Inc., v. Minnesota, 370 N.W. 2d 844 (Minn. 1985) (state
law prohibiting religious discrimination in employment did not violate First Amendment
rights of health club operated by “born-again” Christians), appeal dismissed, 478 U.S.
1015 (1986).
51
52

See note ** supra.

Douglas Laycock, “Afterword,” in Same-Sex Marriage and Religious Liberty,
supra note __, at 194-201; Robin Fretwell Wilson, “Matters of Conscience: Lessons for
Same-Sex Marriage from the Health-Care Context,” in Same-Sex Marriage and Religious
Liberty, supra note __, at 77-102; see also Robin Fretwell Wilson, Same-Sex Marriage
and Religious Liberty: Life After Prop 8, 14 Nexus 101 (2009); Robin Fretwell Wilson,
A Matter of Conviction: Moral Clashes over Same-Sex Adoption, 22 B.Y.U. J. Pub. L
475 (2008).
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marriages, except where such a refusal imposes significant hardship on the same-sex
couple.” 53
Now that state legislatures have gotten into the same-sex marriage business, these
arguments have begun to appear in the political arena. 54 In the process leading up to
Connecticut’s recent legislation on same-sex marriage, a group of legal academics
(including Wilson and Laycock) proposed a broad exemption for all individuals and
religious entities from laws that would impose on them, in violation of their sincerely
held religious beliefs, a duty to provide goods and services related to the solemnization of
any marriage. 55 Unlike the scholarly works of Wilson and Laycock, this proposal made
no exception for serious hardship to same-sex couples. The Connecticut legislature soon
thereafter enacted a provision that protected religious organizations from any such duty to
provide such goods or services, 56 but omitted the proposed exemption for individuals and
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Douglas Laycock, “Afterword,” in Same-Sex Marriage and Religious Liberty,
supra note __, at 198.
54

See Jacqueline L. Salmon, Religious Exemptions in Same-Sex Laws Under
Scrutiny, WASH. POST, May 14 2009, available at
http://newsweek.washingtonpost.com/onfaith/godingovernment/2009/05/by_jacqueline_l
_salmon_as.html.
55

Letter of April 20, 2009, from Thomas C. Berg, Carl H. Esbeck, Robin Fretwell
Wilson, and Richard W. Garnett to the Honorable Christopher G. Donovan, Speaker of
the Connecticut House, re: Religious Liberty Implications of Raised Bill 899, available at
http://www.nationformarriage.org/atf/cf/%7B39D8B5C1-F9FE-48C0-ABE61029BA77854C%7D/Berg.etal.pdf. Professor Laycock also submitted a letter, dated
April 21, 2009, to Speaker Donovan, available at
http://www.nationformarriage.org/atf/cf/%7B39D8B5C1-F9FE-48C0-ABE61029BA77854C%7D/Laycock.pdf, endorsing the recommendations made in the April 20
letter and expanding on the arguments in support of such exemptions.
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Connecticut Public Act No. 09-13, “An Act Implementing the Guarantee of
Equal Protection under the Constitution of the State
23 for Same-Sex Couples,” Sec. 17

businesses.
The question of such an exemption for individuals and firms is largely a matter of
legislative discretion, because neither same-sex couples nor providers of commercial
goods enjoy significant constitutional protection in the areas affected by this dispute. 57
Same-sex couples have no federal constitutional right to be free from discrimination,
based on sexual orientation, in the non-governmental provision of goods and services. 58
Although roughly half the states prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation, 59 the
contours of that protection can be modified by legislation. 60 Likewise, the federal

(exempting all religiously affiliated organizations from any obligation “to provide
services, accommodations, advantage[s], facilities, goods or privileges to an individual if
the request for such services is related to the solemnization of a marriage or celebration
of a marriage and such solemnization or celebration is in violation of [the organization’s]
religious beliefs and faith”).
57

See North Coast Women’s Care Medical Group, Inc. v. Benitez, 44 Cal. 4th
1145, 2008 Cal. LEXIS 10093 (Sup. Ct. Cal., Aug. 18, 2008) (neither state nor federal
constitutions support exemption of physicians group from state law prohibition on
discrimination, based on sexual orientation, against lesbian patient seeking fertility
treatment). Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 2009 U.S.App. LEXIS ____ (9th Cir. 2009) (Free
Exercise Clause does not exempt pharmacists from regulation requiring them to fill all
prescriptions).
58

To the extent that the exemptions would apply to conduct by private actors, the
conduct at issue would not constitute state action. On this point, we disagree with
Professor Feldblum, who suggests that states are under an affirmative constitutional duty
to protect same-sex couples from private discrimination. Chai R. Feldblum, Moral
Conflict and Conflicting Liberties, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY, note xx supra, at 152-154. Same-sex couples, however, may have state and
federal constitutional protections with respect to the conduct of public officials. See infra
text at notes XX-XX.
59
60

See, e.g., Nancy K. Ota, Queer Recount, 64 ALB. L. REV. 889 (2001)

Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), suggests a constitutional limit on the
power to modify such legislation on a wholesale24basis at the expense of minorities

Constitution’s Free Exercise Clause does not require the accommodation of commercial
or public actors who have religious objections to serving same-sex couples. After
Employment Division v. Smith, such actors would need to show that anti-discrimination
rules from which they seek exemption are not “neutral, generally applicable regulatory
law[s].” 61 Because protections for same-sex couples do not specifically target religious
conduct or motives, the Free Exercise Clause offers no support for exemption claims.
For exemption proponents, the same-sex marriage controversy involves a
collision between irreconcilable moral commitments, each of which deserves respect. On
one side, many people view same-sex intimate relationships as morally good and
deserving of public support and protection equal to that enjoyed by opposite-sex
relationships. On the other side, many people hold religious beliefs that regard same-sex
intimacy as sinful, and some believe that they have a religious obligation not to
encourage or assist that sinful conduct. The collision of these two views has the potential
to cause great suffering, either to the religious integrity of those forced to facilitate what
they believe to be sinful conduct, or to the dignity of same-sex couples if they are denied
access to publicly available benefits.
The proposed regime of exemptions attempts to minimize the suffering caused by
this collision, and to maximize the opportunity for all people to participate fully in public
– including commercial – life. 62 Under such a regime, religious objectors would be

defined by sexual orientation, but the circumstances of modification in Romer were quite
extreme.
61
62

Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 880 (1990).

Wilson, Matters of Conscience, note xx supra at 97-102; Laycock, Afterword,
note xx supra at 197-201. Koppelman also proposes
25 a regime of exemptions, but is less

exempted from a duty to serve same-sex couples, unless a specific refusal of service
would impose a “significant hardship” on those seeking the service. 63 Proponents
contend that same-sex couples would rarely be refused services even under a broad
exemption; few merchants would be willing to pay the economic cost of rejecting a
whole class of consumers, and same-sex couples would be able to quickly find substitute
providers if confronted with a seller unwilling to assist them. 64 Thus, proponents argue,
there is no reason to believe that same-sex couples would be systematically denied access
to publicly available goods and services.
For those who are sensitive to both sides of this conflict, the proposed exemption
has significant appeal. Such an exemption seems especially effective in addressing the
criticism, made by religious conservatives, that official recognition of same-sex intimacy
would require all people to support the practice. Nonetheless, the proposed exemption
invites skepticism and careful scrutiny because it is legally anomalous. In no other
respects are individuals and for-profit entities excused, on religious grounds, from
compliance with non-discrimination laws. 65
Exemption proponents have pointed to what they assert are two analogous
regimes of religious exemptions -- the obligation of employers to make reasonable
accommodations for the religious beliefs and practices of employees, and the right of
explicit about the details. Koppelman, You Can't Hurry Love, note xx supra at 146.
63

Wilson, Matters of Conscience, note xx supra at 101; Laycock, Afterword, note
xx supra at 198.
64
65

Koppelman, You Can’t Hurry Love, note xx, supra at 132-35.

Non-profit religious entities are generally exempt from prohibitions on
religion-based discrimination in employment decisions. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-1 (Title
VII, Sec. 702 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
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healthcare providers and institutions not to provide abortion-related services. We think
those two schemes are quite different in character from the proposed exemption for those
who refuse service to same-sex couples. The differences suggest reasons for legislators
to be reluctant to grant the proposed exemption.
1. Religious accommodations in the workplace
In developing their arguments for religious objections to facilitating same-sex
marriage, Professors Laycock and Wilson point to the model of religious accommodation
in the workplace. 66 At first glance, the parallel seems very strong. Under Title VII of the
1964 Civil Rights Act and analogous state employment discrimination laws, employers
have an affirmative obligation to accommodate the religious needs of their employees. 67
This obligation is designed to ensure that religious adherents are not arbitrarily or
invidiously excluded from the workplace, but are instead given a reasonable opportunity
to take up any occupation. 68 Thus, Title VII protects individuals from employment
discrimination based on religious belief and religious conduct. 69
If an employee shows that compliance with a workplace obligation would require
the employee to violate a religious obligation, then the burden shifts to the employer to

66

See Wilson, The Limits of Conscience, note xx supra at 51-52; Laycock,
Afterword, note xx supra, at 199.
67

The leading decisions on the duty and its scope are TWA v. Hardison, 432 U.S.
63 (1977), and Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60 (1986).
68

See Steven D. Jamar, Accommodating Religion at Work: A Principled
Approach to Title VII and Religious Freedom, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 719, 784 (1996).
69

Title VII 42 USC 2000e(j). See also MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. 151B (2006),
§4; N.J. STAT. ANN. 10:5-12(q) (2008); N.Y. LAWS ANN. § 296 Unlawful
Discriminatory Practices (2009).
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show that the employee’s religious need cannot be accommodated without imposing an
“undue hardship” on the employer. 70 The balancing of religious commitment and secular
hardship is thus a significant feature of the law of the workplace.
The analogy to workplace accommodations, however, is deeply strained when
applied to the proposed exemption for those who do not want to serve same-sex couples.
For purposes of providing religious accommodations to others, customers and employers
are not comparable. At the most basic level, employers have power in the relationship
and access to information that customers do not ordinarily possess. Take, for example, a
bakery in which an employee seeks a religious exemption from baking, decorating, or
delivering cakes for same-sex couples. The owner of the bakery would be able to assess
the effect of an accommodation on the distribution of responsibilities within the bakery,
propose alternative measures for avoiding or mitigating the conflict with the employee’s
religious obligations, and ultimately decide whether or not to make an accommodation.
If, however, the bakery owner believes that the bakery itself should not serve
same-sex couples, those couples have neither the information nor the authority to assess
the relative significance of the bakery’s claim, the availability of measures less
burdensome than complete denial of service, or even the extent of the burden that the
refusal imposes on same-sex couples generally. Instead, the couple knows only that they
must seek out a different bakery, and must hope that the next one is willing to serve them.
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Webb v. City of Philadelphia, 562 F.3d 256, 259 (3rd Cir. 2009) (applying the
burden shifting scheme to religious accommodation claims under Title VII in the Third
Circuit); E.E.O.C. v. Firestone Fibers & Textiles, Co., 515 F.3d 307 (4th Cir. 2008)
(applying the scheme in the Fourth Circuit); Morrissette-Brown v. Mobile Infirmary
Medical Center, 506 F3d 1317, 1321 (11th Cir. 2007) (applying the scheme in the
Eleventh Circuit).
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Even if the bakery has the burden of showing, in a legal action for discrimination, the
sincerity of its religious objection and the lack of significant hardship on the same-sex
couple, the power and information imbalance remain.
Wilson and Laycock contend that the problem of information asymmetry can be
alleviated by a public notice requirement, 71 through which religious objectors must
inform customers of the unavailability of service to same-sex couples. But such a
requirement, as Laycock acknowledges, may impose even greater burdens on same-sex
couples. In some areas at least, public pronouncements of exclusion might make such
refusals even more common. 72 More importantly, however, that information does
nothing to address the real imbalance between merchant and customer. Advance
knowledge that a particular store does not serve same-sex couples may help avoid some
measure of dignitary harm, but does nothing to assist those couples in locating providers
that are willing to serve them. A more appropriate informational requirement would
demand that, as a condition of the exemption, religious objectors provide customers with
a list of ready and willing providers.
The analogy between accommodation of employees and exemption of service
providers is also questionable because of the different character of the burdens imposed
by the respective exemptions. In the employer-employee relationship, as in almost every
other setting in which religious exemptions are claimed, the costs of the burden can be
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See Wilson, Matters of Conscience, note xx supra, at 98; Laycock, Afterword,
note xx supra, at 198-99 (envisioning “a requirement that merchants that refuse to serve
same-sex couples announce that fact on their website or, for businesses with only a local
service area, on a sign outside their premises.”)
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See Laycock, Afterword, note xx supra, at 199.
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broadly distributed. For example, the military service exemption for conscientious
objectors imposes a direct burden on government, which must seek a broader pool of
potential draftees. Individual potential draftees also experience an increased, though
widely diffused, burden in the form of a marginally greater risk of being conscripted.
Likewise, a statute that exempts religious users of particular drugs from controlled
substances laws imposes a direct burden on government, which must implement and
administer a scheme for ensuring that such use is limited to the exempted religious group
and purposes. The exemption also imposes an indirect, though likely insubstantial,
burden on other citizens, who could be exposed to risks from those who use the
controlled substance. In the employer-employee relationship, the employer bears the
direct burden of a religious accommodation, but any economic cost can be spread among
all customers. 73
The proposed religious exemptions to public accommodation laws, however,
impose their direct costs on a discrete set of customers. When a same-sex couple is
denied service, the couple must absorb the full burden of such a denial – measured in the
time and other expense incurred in locating a willing provider, along with the dignitary
harm of being refused access to services that are otherwise available to the public. 74

73

Seen in this light, the burden of religious accommodation does not materially
differ from other burdens imposed on employers, such as the duty to make reasonable
accommodations for disabled employees. The employer has the information to assess the
reasonableness of potential accommodations, and the ability to spread among all
customers the costs required to make such an accommodation.
74

As such, the harm to same-sex couples from the Wilson-Laycock proposals is
qualitatively distinct from the burden imposed by any other religious accommodation.
See generally, Jonathan C. Lipson, On Balance: Religious Liberty and Third-Party
Harms, 84 MINN. L. REV. 589 (2000). The closest
30 analogies to this burden can be found

This direct burden would also be unique to same-sex couples, because religious objectors
have no general right to refuse service to other groups of people. 75
2. Conscientious objection to participation in abortions
Professor Wilson’s argument for exemptions invokes parallels with rights of
in statutes that accommodate the practice of faith healing. Parents who refuse traditional
medical care for their children, and instead seek spiritual healing, are often granted partial
exemptions from laws regulating child abuse and neglect – up to the point at which the
child’s health is placed in serious danger by the refusal of medical care. See Jennifer L.
Rosato, Putting Square Pegs in a Round Hole, Procedural Due Process and the Effect of
Faith Healing Exemptions on the Prosecution of Faith Healing Parents, 29 U.S.F. L.
REV. 43, n.41 (1994) (listing statutory exemptions for faith-healing parents). The burden
of such an accommodation quite obviously falls on the ill child, who is denied
conventional medical care out of deference to the parents’ religious beliefs. But the
parent-child relationship is distinguishable from the merchant-customer relationship.
Most importantly, the Constitution recognizes a zone of deference to parental judgments,
in which the state does not ordinarily intrude. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972) (free exercise clause and parental rights to control upbringing of children supports
exemption from duty of parents to send children to accredited school until the age of 16).
See also Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (Mother’s fundamental liberty interests
under the federal Constitution were violated by state law that gave visitation rights to
child’s paternal grandparents). This zone can be explained by the (controversial)
presumption of parents’ special care and concern for the child, knowledge of the child’s
particular needs, and interest in forming the child’s religious identity. See Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (“It is cardinal with us that the custody, care
and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom
include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder”). Merchants
have no such bond with or authority over their customers, so imposition of burdens in the
context of arms’-length commercial dealings cannot be similarly justified.
75

The question of third-party burdens is constitutionally significant. The
Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized Establishment Clause limits on the state’s
power to burden third parties as a means for accommodating the religious concerns of
others. See TWA, Inc. v. Hardison, 423 U.S. 63 (1977); Estate of Thornton v. Caldor,
472 U.S. 703 (1985); and Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005). For general
discussion, see Ira C. Lupu and Robert W. Tuttle, Instruments of Accommodation: The
Military Chaplaincy and the Constitution, 110 W. Va. L. Rev. 89, 107-112 (2007). The
proposed exemption avoids constitutional problems only if it is limited to circumstances
in which a refusal of services does not cause substantial harm to those refused.
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conscientious objection in the context of abortion. 76 Before conscience clauses, she
contends, those who sought abortion attempted to force doctors and hospitals to provide
such services. 77 Conscience clauses limit the overreaching claims of patients; such
clauses specify that health care providers and facilities are not required to perform certain
acts to which they are morally opposed. 78 Religious believers, she contends, should have
a similar right not to facilitate same-sex relationships.
The widespread acceptance of a right to conscientious objection rests on a shared
recognition that abortion has a moral character that is categorically distinct from other
practices, medical or otherwise. Exemptions from mandatory provision of abortion
services, like those from conscription in times of war, focus specifically on those who
might be forced to terminate human life. 79 In other words, the exemption reflects the
specific moral character of the act, rather than a more general deference to the subjective
demands of conscience. Thus, proponents of exemptions have been much less successful
in enacting broader measures that would exempt healthcare professionals and facilities
from any obligation to provide services they might deem objectionable.80
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Wilson, Matters of Conscience, note xx supra at 81-85, 93.
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Id. at 79.
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Id. (referring to the “primogenitor of healthcare conscience clauses, the Church
Amendment”). See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. title XVI, ch. 112, § 121; TENN.
CODE ANN. § 68-34-104; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-6-102; ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 20-16-304.
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In addition, healthcare professionals and institutions are frequently exempted
from obligations to perform sterilization procedures; this exemption is based on the close
connection, within some religious traditions, between interference with conception and
the taking of human life.
80

For example, the Obama administration
32 has now proposed to rescind the

By contrast, the proposed religious exemption in the context of same-sex marriage
is not focused on any specific act, much less an act that involves the taking of human life.
A provider of goods or services is covered if he or she has a sincere religious objection to
performing acts that facilitate same-sex relationships. 81 Neither the “religious” character
of the objection nor the concept of “facilitation” offer meaningful external constraints on
the provider’s claimed exemption.
The exemption applies to any action that would facilitate a same-sex marriage,
with “facilitation” defined in purely subjective terms. As Laycock points out,
cooperation in wrongdoing is a well-established legal, moral, and theological category,
with a rich history of sophisticated analysis. 82 But that analysis is beside the point in this
context because only one person’s opinion determines whether particular conduct would
facilitate same-sex marriage – that of the one who seeks an exemption. Citing Thomas v.
Review Board, 83 in which the Supreme Court held that a member of the Jehovah’s
Witnesses should be excused from working in a munitions factory, Wilson asserts that
“objectors get to decide how offensive a task is, not the rest of the world.” 84
regulations, promulgated in the waning days of the Administration of George W. Bush,
designed to widen the scope of conscientious exemptions for health care workers in the
U.S. See Rescission of the Regulation Entitled “Ensuring that {HHS} Funds Do Not
Support Coercive or Discriminatory Policies or Practices in Violation of Federal Law,”
74 Fed. Reg., No. 45, March 10, 2009, available at
http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2009/pdf/E9-5067.pdf.
81

Wilson, Matters of Conscience, note xx supra at 100; Laycock, Afterword, note
xx supra at 195; Koppelman, Can’t Hurry Love, note xx supra at 135.
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Wilson, The Limits of Conscience, note xx supra at 92.
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Moreover, the exemption could be claimed by anyone who believes that his or her
conduct would facilitate a same-sex marriage – that is, the ongoing relationship between
a same-sex couple, and not just the wedding ceremony itself. Although proponents
emphasize services provided in connection with the act of getting married, the exemption
extends to all services sought by same-sex couples during the entire course of a
relationship, from food and shelter to healthcare and legal representation. Seen in that
light, this exemption is starkly different from conscientious objection in the abortion
context. In the healthcare setting, medical professionals have a general duty to treat
patients, but are relieved of the duty to provide a specific service – regardless of the
identity of the patient seeking that service. In the proposed exemption at issue here,
service providers are free to refuse assistance to an entire group of people – those in
same-sex relationships – no matter how remote the assistance sought is from any specific
action, such as a wedding or adoption of a child.
This concern would be alleviated if exemption proponents restricted their claim to
acts directly connected with the solemnization of same-sex marriage, such as celebration
of or other direct participation in the wedding ceremony. Framed in that way, the
exemption would be narrowly tailored to a specific act about which the public has
significant moral ambivalence – the state endorsement of same-sex intimacy. Such an
exemption would allow individuals to distance themselves from that endorsement,
without permitting a categorical refusal of goods and services to same-sex couples. With
the exemption so narrowed, the analogy to the abortion regime is considerably stronger.
When applied to goods and services provided by the government, however, the
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analogy to conscientious objection in the abortion context is especially inappropriate.
The right to abortion is a negative liberty, 85 and thus the state has a duty not to interfere
with the exercise of that right. 86 But the state has no constitutional obligation to facilitate
access to abortion, and indeed the state has a legitimate interest in protecting nascent life,
so long as the state does not impose an “undue burden” on the right to abortion. 87 Seen
in this light, the balancing of burdens between providers and patients is entirely
appropriate; patients only have a right to object when the state places significant
obstacles in the way of access.
Same-sex marriage, however, is not a negative liberty, at least with respect to the
state. The state creates and maintains a monopoly over the legal institution of marriage.
Anyone who wishes to marry must obtain a license from the state – even if the marriage
is later celebrated by a religious official. 88 Because the state creates this benefit, denial
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Id; see also Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 510 (1989)
(“Nothing in the Constitution requires States to enter or remain in the business of
performing abortions. Nor… do private physicians and their patients have some kind of
constitutional right of access to public facilities for the performance of abortions”).
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See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1994) (finding that “a
statute which, while furthering the interest in potential life or some other valid state
interest, has the effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman's choice
cannot be considered a permissible means of serving its legitimate ends”).
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Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 8xx
(1992) (state may adopt measures to encourage choice of carrying pregnancy to term
instead of terminating it by abortion) (plurality opinion); see also Webster v.
Reproductive health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (state may open public hospitals to
childbirth while closing them to abortions); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980)
(government may fund medical expenses of childbirth but not abortion).
88

Wilson, Matters of Conscience, note xx supra at 97 (officials authorized by the
state to issue marriage licenses “stand as an entryway into legal marriage”).
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of access to marriage has a very different character from the state’s denial of funding for,
or other restrictions on, abortion services. With respect to abortions, the state satisfies its
obligation simply by refraining from coercively restricting access. 89 The right to marry,
however, is the affirmative right of access to the state’s administrative process for
granting that benefit. It rests on a claim of equality, not a claim of fundamental liberty.
This distinction between abortion and same-sex marriage is important for
assessing Wilson’s argument that public employees should be exempt from duties
involving same-sex marriage. She suggests several measures for accommodating
religious objections of those responsible for processing marriage applications. 90 The
marriage clerk’s office could identify clerks willing to process applications from samesex couples; if no one in that office was willing to process the applications, Wilson
suggests that the office could direct the couple to a different office or arrange to have the
couple’s paperwork processed elsewhere. 91 This might require same-sex couples to drive
longer distances or wait a longer period of time in order to obtain a marriage license,
Wilson concedes, but “it does not frustrate a couple’s ability to marry.” 92
This comparison ignores the couple’s interest in equal treatment under law. The
extension of rights of conscience to such equality interests has no analogy or support in
existing law. Under Article VI of the U.S. Constitution, all executive and judicial
89

See, e.g., Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 874 (“The fact that a law which
serves a valid purpose, one not designed to strike at the right itself, has the incidental
effect of making it more difficult or more expensive to procure an abortion cannot be
enough to invalidate it”).
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Wilson, Matters of Conscience, note xx supra, at 98-99.
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Id.
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Wilson, Matters of Conscience, note xx supra, at 99.
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officers of the states must swear or affirm their duty to support the Constitution, 93 and
many state constitutions require executive and judicial officers to make a similar oath or
affirmation. 94 Thus, under both the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment, and
related equality provisions of state constitutions, 95 such state officers have duties of equal
respect to all persons within the state. It’s very difficult to see how one can square such a
duty with a right, religion-based or otherwise, to refuse to provide public services to a
particular class of individuals. 96
In this regard, the provisions in the Maine and New Hampshire statutes that
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U.S. Const. Art. VI, cl. 3.
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See, e.g., Ala. Const. Art XVI, § 279; Calif. Const. Art 20, § 3; Conn. Const.
Art. II, § 1; Del. Const. Art. XIV, § 1; Maryland Const., Art. I, § 9; Mont. Const. Art. III,
§ 3; Neb. Const. Art. XV, § 1; N.Y. Const. Art. XVIII, § 1; Ohio Const. Art. XV, § 7; Pa.
Const. Art. VI, § 3; Vt. Const. Ch. II, § 56; Wis. Const. Art. IV, § 28.
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In Massachusetts, Iowa, and Connecticut, state supreme court opinions place
the right to same-sex marriage explicitly on state constitutional guarantees of equality. A
similar situation obtained in California in the time between The Marriage Cases and the
enactment of Prop 8.
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These concepts of the general duty of public officials and employees inform the
leading appellate decision on the subject of religion-based exemptions from the duty to
serve all impartially. See Rodriguez v. City of Chicago, 156 F.3d 771 (7th Cir. 1998)
(rejecting police officer’s request for religious accommodation that would excuse him
from having to guard an abortion clinic). Concurring in Rodriguez, Judge Posner argued
that government officials should never be free to refuse to serve a particular class. “The
objection to recusal . . . is not the inconvenience to the police department, the armed
forces, or the fire department, as the case may be, though that might be considerable in
some instances. The objection is to the loss of public confidence in governmental
protective services if the public knows that its protectors are at liberty to pick and choose
whom to protect.” Id. at 778-79. See also Parrott v. District of Columbia, 1991 WL
126020 (D.D.C. 1991) (police department is not under a legal duty to make a reasonable
accommodation of officer’s religious attitudes about abortion and relieve him of duty to
protect abortion clinic.); Ryan v. Department of Justice, 950 F.2d 458 (7th Cir. 1991)
(upholding discharge of FBI agent who refused on religious grounds to investigate antiwar activists).
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relieve all persons, authorized by law to officiate at a marriage, from the obligation to
solemnize any particular marriage deserve special attention. 97 We have discovered no
law on the question whether a Justice of the Peace or other official authorized to officiate
is under a statutory duty to perform marriages when requested, and we expect no such
specific duty exists. 98 The task – involving a face-to-face pronouncement in words that
others are married – might well be understood as deeply personal as well as professional,
and therefore subject to the exercise of unfettered discretion. 99 Consistent with this
theory of the role, the Maine and New Hampshire schemes confer exactly this sort of
broad-based discretion; neither enactment singles out same-sex marriages as the only
kind that would trigger relief from an otherwise applicable duty to marry all. Despite
97

Maine, “An Act to End Discrimination in Civil Marriage and Affirm Religious
Freedom,” Section 5: “19-A MRSA §655, sub-§3, available at
http://www.mainelegislature.org/legis/bills/bills_124th/chappdfs/PUBLIC82.pdf, is
enacted to read: “3. Affirmation of Religious Freedom. . . . A person authorized to join
persons in marriage and who fails or refuses to join persons in marriage is not subject to
any fine or other penalty for such failure or refusal.” New Hampshire, An Act Affirming
Religious Freedom Protections with Regard to Marriage, Sec. IV, available at
http://www.gencourt.state.nh.us/legislation/2009/HB0073.html: “Members of the clergy
as described in RSA 457:31 or other persons otherwise authorized under law to
solemnize a marriage shall not be obligated or otherwise required by law to officiate at
any particular civil marriage or religious rite of marriage in violation of their right to free
exercise of religion protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution
or by part I, article 5 of the New Hampshire constitution.”
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Indeed, it would be quite surprising if high-level judges, both state and federal,
were under any such legal duty. We could imagine Supreme Court Justices, and other
prominent jurists, being quite busy with weddings if they were obliged to officiate on
request.
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In this respect, the act of marrying a couple is readily distinguishable from an
administrator’s processing of marriage paperwork. The former involves a public
declaration of the couple’s marriage, while the latter does not require the administrator to
express any public approval of the act.
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these provisions, the state as a whole has a constitutional duty to supply public officials
for the task of performing same-sex marriages. If no public officials were willing to do
so, same-sex couples could quite literally and legitimately complain that they were not
being afforded equal protection of the laws. 100
The absence of legal precedent or analogy for a broad exemption to a duty to
serve same-sex couples raises two concerns. First, because the exemption is potentially
much broader in scope than other religious exemptions, and lacks the practical constraints
present in the employment context, we question whether proponents are correct in
predicting that the exemption would have little effect on same-sex couples. Indeed, in
states that now include sexual orientation under public accommodations and other antidiscrimination laws, the exemption would effectively withdraw existing protections from
same-sex couples. Second, the proposed exemption would offer a precedent that could
be invoked to support even broader claims of religious exemption from public
accommodations laws. The general principle advanced by exemption proponents is that
individuals should not be required to assist conduct they believe to be sinful. Why would
not the same solicitude extend to a merchant who does not want to serve an unwed
mother, or to serve someone who has religious beliefs that the merchant finds
objectionable?
Of course, exemptions of the type discussed in this part can serve as a bargaining
100

Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1973) (state may not put an entire “class of
persons [outside] the right to seek specific protection from the law.”). Because we cannot
imagine such a widespread and total refusal of official participation in a state that has
been legislatively willing to recognize same-sex marriage, we do not speculate on the
remedy that would follow from a violation. An order that all public officials stop
performing opposite-sex marriages until the problem had been solved would probably do
the trick.
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chip in the legislative negotiations that are on the horizon in a number of states. If
acceding to them will get a same-sex marriage deal done, the temptation to go along
would be quite understandable. But if we were representing the campaign for same-sex
marriage, we would be extremely unlikely to concede to these exemptions without very
widespread and substantial policy benefits in return. Given the state-by-state character of
these legislative negotiations, it is hard to see how and where any such bargain could be
struck. 101
C. Religious Organizations and the Status Incidents of Family Life
The third, and most difficult, category of potential conflicts relates to a broad
array of religiously affiliated organizations, and the extent of their freedom to refuse to
recognize the equal status of same-sex families. These cases may concern the celebration
of weddings, but they more typically involve whether such organizations will treat samesex married couples as equal to opposite-sex couples for purposes of eligibility for other
goods, services, or benefits. Cases in this category have given rise to some of the highest
profile conflicts in the field – for example, the case of Ocean Grove Meeting Association,
discussed above; the decision by Catholic Charities of Boston to surrender its license as
an adoption agency rather than place children with same-sex couples, as state law
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Gay rights groups might be attracted to a bargain that involved repeal of
federal DOMA in exchange for some guarantee of religious exemptions from state nondiscrimination laws. See Blankenhorn & Rauch, Op-Ed, A Reconciliation on Gay
Marriage, N.Y TIMES, Feb. 21, 2009, at WK11, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/22/opinion/22rauch.html. But the coordination
problems in putting together such a deal seem very formidable, and any federal statutory
protection for religious freedom against state law would raise constitutional questions
about the scope of congressional power to protect religion. City of Boerne v. Archbishop
Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
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requires; 102 and the refusal by Yeshiva University to make its married student housing
available to a same-sex couple. 103 Also included in this category of cases are those
involving benefits for the spouses of employees of religiously affiliated organizations,
and benefits provided by religiously affiliated fraternal benefit associations.
In this third category, patterns of convergence and divergence have appeared
among the states that have thus far legislated on same-sex marriage. Connecticut, New
Hampshire, and Vermont all exempt religiously affiliated organizations from any
obligation to “celebrate” a marriage, and all three exempt religiously affiliated fraternal
benefit associations from any obligation to accept as members, or pay insurance benefits
to, parties to same-sex unions. 104 Connecticut alone, however, has a special exception for
social services, including adoption, delivered by religious organizations, so long as those
services are funded exclusively from private sources. 105 And only New Hampshire has a
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See Father Robert Carr, Boston’s Catholic Charities to Stop Adoption
Services over Same-Sex Law, Catholic Online News, 3/10/06, available at
http://www.catholic.org/national/national_story.php?id=19017
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See Levin v. Yeshiva University, 754 N.E. 2d 1099 (Court of Appeals of NY,
2001) (reinstating complaint by lesbian couple alleging that university’s policy of
refusing them access to married student housing violated state law prohibition on
discrimination based on sexual orientation). The University did not raise a defense of
religious freedom in the case.
104

Connecticut Public Act No. 09-13, “An Act Implementing the Guarantee of
Equal Protection under the Constitution of the State for Same-Sex Couples,” available at
http://www.cga.ct.gov/2009/ACT/PA/2009PA-00013-R00SB-00899-PA.htm; Vermont,
“An Act to Protect Religious Freedom and Recognize Equality in Civil Marriage,”
sections 10(b), 11, available at http://www.leg.state.vt.us/docs/2010/bills/Passed/S115.pdf; New Hampshire, An Act Affirming Religious Freedom Protections with Regard
to Marriage, secs. III-IV, available at
http://www.gencourt.state.nh.us/legislation/2009/HB0073.html.
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Connecticut Public Act No. 09-13, Sec.
41 19: “Nothing in this act shall be

provision that exempts religious organizations from any obligation to provide goods or
services “if such request for such [goods or] services . . . is related to . . . the promotion
of marriage through religious counseling, programs, courses, retreats, or housing
designated for married individuals, and such . . . promotion of marriage is in violation of
their religious belief and faith.” 106 None of the legislating states enacted a provision
explicitly relating to spousal benefits for employees of religiously affiliated
organizations.
In this third category, only the cases involving celebration of same-sex weddings
present any plausible claim of constitutionally mandated exemptions. But many of these
disputes, in which conflicting intuitions, policies, and principles are manifest, present
plausible cases for permissive legislative accommodation, and the divergences among the
states suggest that this third category presents the most fruitful arena for legislative
compromise. In this section of the paper, we sketch some overarching policy concerns
which we hope may guide legislative deliberation about such accommodations. In Part

deemed or construed to affect the manner in which a religious organization may provide
adoption, foster care or social services if such religious organization does not receive
state or federal funds for that specific program or purpose,” available at
http://www.cga.ct.gov/2009/ACT/PA/2009PA-00013-R00SB-00899-PA.htm.
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New Hampshire, An Act Affirming Religious Freedom Protections with
Regard to Marriage, sec. III, available at
http://www.gencourt.state.nh.us/legislation/2009/HB0073.html(emphasis added). Maine
is the outlier; its rather different statutory formula specifies that the same-sex marriage
law “. . . does not authorize any court or other state or local governmental body . . .to
compel, prevent or interfere in any way with any religious institution’s religious doctrine,
policy, teaching or solemnization of marriage within that particular religious faith’s
tradition.” The relative vagueness of the language in the Maine scheme makes it difficult
to predict how the Act will be applied to cases outside the solemnization and celebration
of marriage.
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III.C.2, below, we apply these principles to some of the particular cases within the
category.
1. Guiding principles and policies.
a. The continuum of religious exclusivity. Among the most substantively
important yet administratively difficult considerations is that of religious exclusivity of
the contested service or benefit. The most powerful reason for recognizing the
constitutional right of houses of worship to exclude same-sex couples (or any others) is
this customary pattern of exclusivity. In their normal operation of conferring sacraments
and religious recognition, communities of faith are the very antithesis of the concept of
“public accommodations.” Even if their houses of worship are open to the general public
for purposes of prayer, virtually all faiths that administer sacraments operate on
theological norms of exclusivity. Be it baptism, Bar or Bat Mitzvah, marriage, blessings
at the time of death, or other rites of inclusion in the religious community, many houses
of worship will confer sacraments only on those who, by ancestry, deed, or explicit
commitment, have become (and remain) members of the faith. If, for example,
participation in a same-sex union, or divorce, or unrepented sins, disqualify someone
from good standing in a faith community, principles of both free exercise and
associational freedom buttress the private right of that community to exclude those whose
conduct does not satisfy the relevant religious criteria.
Not all religiously affiliated organizations, however, exclude non-adherents from
participation in the benefits or activities of the organization. For reasons of altruism or
needed financial support, some organizations have voluntarily opened their services and
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facilities without regard to membership status in the faith. This pattern obtains quite
frequently in religiously affiliated organizations, such as Catholic Charities, Lutheran
Social Services, or the Young Men’s Hebrew Association, which provide social services
or recreational opportunities regardless of faith affiliation.
Organizations that are generally open to all without regard to religion are less
sympathetic candidates for exemption from obligations to serve members of same-sex
couples. For example, OGCMA’s decision to exclude only same-sex couples from using
the Boardwalk Pavilion is quite different from a similar organization’s decision to permit
only those of a particular religious group to use its facility. Nevertheless, as the examples
in Part II.C.2 below illustrate, the service context may matter considerably in state policy
decisions about whether to accommodate such particularized exclusionary impulses.
b. Problems of administration.
Recognizing exemptions for public employees and private vendors involves the
difficult enterprise of measuring conflicting hardships and perhaps testing the religious
sincerity of exemption claimants. Exempting religiously affiliated organizations on
these questions can be done in ways that entail no such problems of administration. First,
as the legislation has emerged, no balancing of hardships is involved in applying
institutional exemptions – in all of the legislating states, religious entities may exclude
same-sex couples from goods related to solemnization and celebration of marriage
without regard to the availability of alternative providers.
Moreover, unlike the situation of individuals, whose religious sincerity in this
context may come into legitimate question, no test of sincerity can ever be sensibly
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applied to a faith community’s determinations on issues of sexuality. Whatever the
theological origins of the community’s norms, they will not seem to be the idiosyncratic
result of any particular individual’s response to same-sex intimacy. Rather, such norms
will have been the product of institutional judgment over time, and thus are not readily
subject to meaningful probes of sincerity.
c. The potential withdrawal of valuable social resources.
If some individual objectors to same-sex marriage withdraw from their current
vocation because of the unavailability of exemptions from laws mandating nondiscrimination, social costs are likely to be rather small. Others, willing to serve all, will
take their place as marriage license clerks or providers in the wedding industry. One
cannot, however, make the same confident prediction about religious organizations as
non-profit providers of social services, including adoption, foster care, or education. If
religious organizations withdraw as providers of such services – as was the case with the
decision by Catholic Charities of Boston to surrender its license as an adoption agency in
Massachusetts – the deadweight social loss might be considerable. In non-profit markets
for social services, we have little confidence that other providers will expand, or new
providers will enter, to pick up the slack.
d. The presence of state subsidy and support.
By force of the Constitution, states may have to tolerate conduct that they do not
want to actively support. Even beyond constitutional duty, states may choose to respect
the private right to engage in such conduct, but nevertheless decide not to affirmatively
support it. In various post-Dale cases involving the Boy Scouts, for example, courts have
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upheld state or local decisions, driven by concern over anti-gay discrimination, to
withdraw public subsidy or support from the Scouts. 107 As exemplified by Connecticut’s
same-sex marriage legislation, a state may thus decide to exempt from non-discrimination
principles some service activity of religious institutions that exclude same-sex families,
but only so long as those activities are privately funded. 108
A long line of decisions in the Supreme Court teaches that government may
withhold subsidies, from religious entities as well as others, from institutions that do not
comply with subsidy conditions designed to advance reasonable government policies.109
There is thus little doubt concerning the constitutional validity of governmental decisions
to tolerate certain conduct by religiously affiliated institutions while refusing to subsidize
the same behavior. 110
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Boy Scouts v. Wyman, 335 F.3d 80, 98 (2nd Cir. 2003); Evans v. City of
Berkeley 129 P.3d 394, 404-05 (Calif. 2006).
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Connecticut Public Act No. 09-13, “An Act Implementing the Guarantee of
Equal Protection under the Constitution of the State for Same-Sex Couples,” Sec. 19:
“Nothing in this act shall be deemed or construed to affect the manner in which a
religious organization may provide adoption, foster care or social services if such
religious organization does not receive state or federal funds for that specific program or
purpose,”available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/2009/ACT/PA/2009PA-00013-R00SB00899-PA.htm.
109

NEA v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998); United States v. American Library
Association, 539 U.S. 194 (2003). Indeed, most recently, the Supreme Court reaffirmed
this principle in a case in which the gay rights movement was on the other side.
Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, 547 U.S. 47 (2006). See also
Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004).
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A useful analogy can be found in federal policies with respect to religious
selectivity in hiring by religious organizations. The Supreme Court has upheld the
validity of the provision in Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act that permits such
selectivity, Corp. of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987), but there is
considerable controversy over permitting such selectivity
in government-funded social
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2. Three subsets of conflict.
The four general themes sketched above – degree of exclusivity, problems of
administration, risk of withdrawal of service, and availability of affirmative support –
will operate in varying patterns and degrees with respect to the particular sub-categories
of cases within this final class of conflicts.
a. Goods and services incident to wedding ceremonies.
As noted in Part II.A. above, the same-sex marriage legislation in Vermont,
Connecticut, and New Hampshire all exempt religious organizations – not just houses of
worship – from any obligation to provide goods or services related to the solemnization
or celebration of any marriage. Here, for example, is the relevant Connecticut
provision: 111
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a religious organization, association
or society, or any nonprofit institution or organization operated, supervised or controlled
by or in conjunction with a religious organization, association or society, shall not be
required to provide services, accommodations, advantage[s], facilities, goods or
privileges to an individual if the request for such services is related to the solemnization
of a marriage or celebration of a marriage and such solemnization or celebration is in
violation of their religious beliefs and faith.
For reasons sketched in Part II.A., above, the core of this provision is required by
the Constitution. Communities of faith cannot be legally compelled to solemnize any
class of marriages, and the state should not be in the business of deciding which
religiously affiliated organizations have a sufficient nexus to communities of faith, and
services. See Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, The Faith-Based Initiative and the
Constitution, 55 DePaul L. Rev. 1, 51-57, 102-105 (2005).
111

Connecticut Public Act No. 09-13, “An Act Implementing the Guarantee of
Equal Protection under the Constitution of the State for Same-Sex Couples,” Sec. 17
(signed into law on April 23, 2009), available at
http://www.cga.ct.gov/2009/ACT/PA/2009PA-00013-R00SB-00899-PA.htm.
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their houses of worship, to be entitled to the same freedom of choice. If, for example, a
particular chapel at DePaul University is reserved for Roman Catholic worship and
ceremonies, the state should have no greater power to compel availability of that space
for a same-sex wedding than the state would have for Holy Name Cathedral.
Moreover, the extension of this provision’s coverage to all “services,
accommodations, advantage[s], facilities, goods or privileges . . . if the request for such
services is related to the solemnization of a marriage or celebration of a marriage” seems
constitutionally salutary, even if not constitutionally required. The availability of goods
and services like reception halls for a wedding celebration, a church-supplied musician
for a wedding or wedding reception, or pre-marital counseling for couples within the faith
tradition all seem part of an indivisible enterprise – the determination by authorized
representatives of a religious community as to which unions it will bless.
Notably, the exemption is only relevant for religious institutions that fall within
the definition of “public accommodation” with respect to particular goods, services, or
facilities. Thus, if New Jersey had adopted the laws enacted in Connecticut, Vermont,
and New Hampshire, OGCMA would be free to exclude same-sex couples from using the
Boardwalk Pavilion for marriage ceremonies, even though the facility was otherwise
open to the public. A for-profit enterprise, however, even if closely connected with a
religious entity, would not be covered by this exemption.
Moreover, the existing statutory exemptions are limited to goods and services
used to celebrate or solemnize a marriage. Again returning to the example of OGCMA,
if the Boardwalk Pavilion remained a public accommodation, the Association could
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prohibit its use for purposes of same-sex weddings, but would not receive a general
privilege to discriminate based on sexual orientation. Thus, in such a regime of
exemptions, OGCMA would be required to allow same-sex couples to use the Pavilion,
on equal terms with other couples, for any activities but same-sex weddings. Seen in this
light, the exemption balances the Association’s desire not to have its religious message
compromised or distorted by a same-sex wedding in its Pavilion, with same-sex couples’
interest in having access to the set of goods and services generally available to the public.
In terms of affirmative state support, it is worth noting that the Connecticut statute
goes still further in connection with institutional religious freedom to decide which
marriages to solemnize or celebrate. The statute limits the remedial consequences of
invoking the substantive exemption: 112
Any refusal to provide services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods or
privileges in accordance with this section shall not create any civil claim or cause of
action, or result in any state action to penalize or withhold benefits from such religious
organization, association or society, or any nonprofit institution or organization operated,
supervised or controlled by or in conjunction with a religious organization, association or
society.
This section protects religious organizations that refuse to solemnize or celebrate
particular weddings from loss of state-created benefits, as well as insulating these
organizations from private civil actions or state-imposed punishments. This protection
against loss of state benefits is constitutionally gratuitous, but – in the narrow and
specific context of solemnization or celebration of a marriage – nevertheless seems
sound.
112

Id. In the absence of such exemptions, the remedial consequences for
prohibited denials of service might include civil damages, fines, injunctions against
provision of such goods or services without full compliance with the relevant law, and
loss of state-created benefits.
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2. Services provided to married couples.
The relevant arguments of constitutionality and policy become more balanced,
nuanced, and complex when the context shifts from celebration of a wedding to
recognition of marital status. Others who have contended for religious exemptions have
tended not to identify or emphasize this distinction, 113 but it is of great conceptual
significance. Solemnization and celebration of a wedding are one-time events in the life
of a particular couple, and represent a religious organization’s highest level of
engagement and imprimatur. By contrast, the availability of goods and services may
represent significant material opportunities over a lengthy period of time for a same-sex
couple, and, in at least some circumstances, represent considerably less significant
symbols of approval from a religious organization.
With respect to the availability of such services, important differences appear
among the recent legislative enactments on the subject of same-sex marriage. The most
prominent divergence is that displayed in the New Hampshire law, which goes beyond
the otherwise parallel provisions in Vermont and Connecticut by exempting religious
organizations from any obligation to provide goods or services “if such request for such
[goods or] services . . . is related to . . . . the promotion of marriage through religious
counseling, programs, courses, retreats, or housing designated for married individuals,
and such . . . promotion of marriage is in violation of their religious belief and faith.” 114
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E.g., Stern, supra note XX, at 1-56 (discussing the rights of same-sex couples
without distinguishing issues related to wedding ceremonies from those related to marital
status).
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New Hampshire, An Act Affirming Religious Freedom Protections with
Regard to Marriage, secs. III, available at
http://www.gencourt.state.nh.us/legislation/2009/HB0073.html.
In more general and
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The New Hampshire law authorizes religious entities to apply their own definition
of marriage to questions of the distribution of particular goods and services based on
marital status. This recognition of authority is not limited to same-sex couples, and
religious communities may choose to exercise it in other ways. For example, a church
may exclude from its services for married couples those divorced and remarried
individuals whose status is inconsistent with the church’s strict limits on the availability
of divorce.
For a variety of reasons, the calculus of accommodation is more evenly balanced
between same-sex couples and religious institutions in the context of the particular
benefits covered by the New Hampshire scheme. 115 With respect to most or all of the
items on the list of exempt services – those aimed at the “promotion of marriage through
religious counseling, programs, courses, retreats, or housing designated for married
individuals” – there is good reason to expect that the religious organization is consistently
applying religious norms for the determination of eligibility, and that the services involve
activities with explicitly religious content. That is, such services are likely to be
delivered in a religiously exclusive way. When religious marriage rests on norms that
diverge from those of civil marriage, religious entities should be free to carry them

unfortunately ambiguous terms is Maine’s rather different statutory formula, which
specifies that the same-sex marriage law “. . . does not authorize any court or other state
or local governmental body . . . to compel, prevent or interfere in any way with any
religious institution’s religious doctrine, policy, teaching or solemnization of marriage
within that particular religious faith’s tradition.” It is quite difficult to say just how far
beyond “solemnization” of marriage the Maine statute extends.
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Note that the scheme does not cover all goods and services that might be
designated for married couples – e.g., visitation rights for a same-sex spouse in a
religiously affiliated hospital are not included in the exemption.
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forward through a variety of contexts in which marital status is relevant. Thus, state
exemption policy with respect to religious organizations’ treatment of same-sex couples
might appropriately be tailored to those areas of service in which the likelihood of
consistent expression and application of religious norms seems highest.
This insight sheds important light on a range of problems involving the provision
of social service or other benefits to married couples. For example, some religiously
affiliated universities prefer members of their own faith for admission as students, and
federal law does not restrict such a preference. 116 With respect to such schools,
legislatures should consider accommodating the school’s desire to prefer students of its
own faith for married student housing. Because a same-sex marriage would effectively
(or formally) disqualify a participant from good standing in some faiths, those faiths
should be free to treat same-sex couples like all those who do not measure up to the faith
community’s standards.
The likelihood of consistent religious inclusion and exclusion is not the only
relevant consideration in the calculus of accommodation. As noted above, the risk of
withdrawal of valuable and not easily replaced social services is also a significant policy
consideration. This variable illuminates the now-famous withdrawal of adoption services
by Catholic Charities of Boston, 117 a case which sadly illustrates the social costs that may
116

Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000d et seq., forbids
discrimination based on race, color, or national origin by recipients of federal financial
assistance, but does not forbid religious selectivity by such recipients. To the best of our
knowledge, no state forbids religious preference in admission by religiously affiliated
universities.
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See Father Robert Carr, Boston’s Catholic Charities to Stop Adoption Services
over Same-Sex Law, Catholic Online News, 3/10/06, available at
http://www.catholic.org/national/national_story.php?id=19017
52

be incurred when religious charities are faced with nondiscrimination requirements in
tension with faith principles. Catholic Charities of Boston surrendered its license as an
adoption agency rather than facilitate placements with same-sex couples. State law
required all adoption agencies, secular or religious, to follow broad nondiscrimination
guidelines, and the state legislature was unwilling to provide an exemption for religiously
affiliated agencies that did not want to make such placements.
Such a requirement, though permitted by the federal constitution, generates
obvious trade-offs if it drives from the market large and well-respected providers of a
particular social service. Nothing in the relevant market conditions makes it likely that
other providers, new or pre-existing, will fill the void left in Massachusetts by the
withdrawal of Catholic Charities as a provider of adoption services. A policy of
permissive accommodation would have allowed Catholic Charities and other religiously
affiliated adoption agencies to single out same-sex couples – including those legally
married in Massachusetts – as ineligible for adoption services, but would have
maintained the pre-existing provision of service to couples and children in need. 118
Perhaps in response to the Massachusetts tale, Connecticut has exempted religious
organizations, offering social services such as adoption, from any obligation to serve
same-sex couples, so long as the service is not funded by government. 119
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For a related critique of developments in Massachusetts, see Colleen Theresa
Rutledge, Caught in the Crossfire: How Catholic Charities of Boston was Victim to the
Clash between Gay Rights and Religious Freedom, 15 Duke J. Gender L. & Pol’y 297
(2008); see also Minow, Religious Groups, supra note xx, at 831-843.
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Connecticut Public Act No. 09-13, “An Act Implementing the Guarantee of
Equal Protection under the Constitution of the State for Same-Sex Couples,” Sec. 19:
“Nothing in this act shall be deemed or construed to affect the manner in which a
religious organization may provide adoption, foster
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3. Employee benefits to spouses
This final sub-set of cases is materially significant to same-sex married couples,
and symbolically significant to religious organizations opposed to same-sex marriage. If
one member of a same-sex couple is employed by a religious organization that provides
spousal benefits to employees, should legislatures permit the religious organization to
exclude same-sex spouses from such benefits?
On one, very important level, the conflict suggested by this question is less stark
than it may seem. Religious organizations already have the statutory right, under federal
law and the law of most states, to limit employment to those who belong to and maintain
the employers’ faith. 120 If religious employers are opposed to same-sex intimacy, they
thus have the prerogative to exclude from employment all who engage in intimate same-

religious organization does not receive state or federal funds for that specific program or
purpose,” available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/2009/ACT/PA/2009PA-00013-R00SB00899-PA.htm.
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The federal statutory exemption for religious organizations from Title VII's
prohibition on religious discrimination in employment is codified at 42 U.S.C. sec.
2000e-1(a) (2000). Most states have similar exemptions. For a survey of state
provisions, see Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Government Partnerships with FaithBased Service Providers: The State of the Law," The Roundtable on Religion and Social
Welfare Policy, Nelson A. Rockefeller Institute of Government, SUNY (December,
2002), at 131-169 (Appendix B). The current version of the proposed Employment
Nondiscrimination Act (ENDA), H.R. 3017, 111th Cong., 1st sess., which would extend
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act to discrimination based on a person's "actual or
perceived sexual orientation or gender identity," id. sec. 4, includes an exemption for all
religious organizations that are exempt from Title VII's prohibition on religious
discrimination. Id. at sec. 6. H.R. 3017 is available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/bdquery/z?d111:H.R.3017. If ENDA, as enacted, retains this exemption for religious
employers, they would remain free under federal law to exclude openly gay employees,
whether or not the employer explicitly invoked religious reasons for doing so.
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sex conduct. 121 Participation in a same-sex marriage would be an admission that an
employee was engaged in such conduct, and therefore not acting consistently with the
faith. Accordingly, religiously affiliated organizations could refuse to hire, or could
dismiss, employees who made requests for benefits for a same-sex intimate partner.
Many religiously affiliated employers, however, may not want to maintain a
general policy of religious selectivity, or even a narrower but explicit policy of excluding
sexually active gay employees. A religiously affiliated university, for example, may
want to hire the best faculty it can without regard to religion, especially in fields of study
unrelated to religious concerns. Moreover, such an employer will rarely want to invade
the sexual privacy of its employees. Accordingly, a school with traditional religious
connections may effectively have a policy of “don’t ask, don’t tell” with respect to gay
employees. If the school’s benefits for partners of employees are limited to spouses, and
the state in which the school is located does not recognize same-sex marriage or legal
equivalents such as civil unions, this arrangement can readily survive.
Once the state recognizes same-sex unions, however, and employees enter them
and apply for benefits, the religiously affiliated school is in a bind. The marriage is a
“tell,” and if the school pays the benefits, it will be subsidizing a relationship its faith
tradition condemns. Alternatively, the school will be openly engaged in discrimination
based on sexual orientation if it refuses to pay the benefits.
Perhaps the existence of a legal escape from the obligation to pay such benefits to
same-sex spouses is sufficient to solve the problem presented by this class of conflicts.
There is no obvious policy reason to permit religiously affiliated employers, educational
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See, e.g., Little v. Wuerl, 929 F.2d 944 (3rd Cir. 1991).
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or otherwise, to gain the benefits of the work done by gay employees without incurring
the detriment of paying benefits to their spouses to the precise same extent as those paid
to opposite sex spouses. Under the current regime of employment law, such employers
effectively have three lawful paths open to them – refuse on religious grounds to hire
openly gay employees; end the payment of spousal benefits to all employees; or include
the same-sex spouses (or, civil union partners, in states where that relationship is a
functional equivalent of marriage) in whatever benefits are paid to opposite-sex spouses.
An exemption of religiously affiliated employers from the obligation to cover same-sex
spouses to the same extent as opposite-sex spouses would add a fourth choice to that list,
and reduce legal pressure (though not other, informal pressure) to maintain a regime of
equality.
The issue of spousal benefits for employees thus seems sufficiently complex
under current law, and sufficiently in social and economic flux, that we do not advance
any particular recommendations to legislatures over how to approach these issues. It is
noteworthy that none of the states that legislated on same-sex marriage in the spring of
2009 saw fit to address the problem of spousal benefits paid by religious organizations.
The closest that any of them came to this problem was in the provisions related to
the rather different context of fraternal benefit societies. Vermont, Connecticut, and New
Hampshire each has a provision that exempts such societies from any obligation “to
provide insurance benefits to any person if to do so would violate the fraternal benefit
society’s free exercise of religion . . .” 122 Such protections of fraternal benefit societies,
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, See, e.g., in Vermont, see “An Act to Protect Religious Freedom and
Recognize Equality in Civil Marriage,” section 10, available at
http://www.leg.state.vt.us/docs/2010/bills/Passed/S-115.pdf;
in New Hampshire, see An
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such as the Knights of Columbus and others which may have religious criteria for
membership, arise in the more compelling constitutional context of associational
relationships rather than employment relationships. Accordingly, these societies
presented a more constitutionally appealing and relatively cost-free case for
accommodation than do religiously affiliated employers not generally engaged in making
religious distinctions among employees.
CONCLUSION
In the first few years after Goodridge, the spread of Defense of Marriage Acts had
religious forces on the offensive against the recognition and spread of same-sex marriage.
California’s Proposition 8 had appeared to confirm that trend. But more recent events,
including the dramatic and uncoerced recognition by the New Hampshire, Vermont, and
Maine legislatures of such marriages, indicate that the forces of social and political
gravity have begun to pull the tides in a different direction. Moreover, the demographics
associated with this issue suggest that, in the medium to long run, the forces that support
same-sex marriage are destined to prevail.123 In the future, religious coalitions opposed
to such marriage may well have to adjust to a political world in which legislative
compromises will be important to the future of religious freedom on the question of
marriage.
Act Affirming Religious Freedom Protections with Regard to Marriage, sec. III, available
at http://www.gencourt.state.nh.us/legislation/2009/HB0073.html.
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See Adam Nagourney, Same-Sex Marriage Holds Peril for GOP, NY Times,
April 28, 2009, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/29/us/politics/29memo.html?_r=1&scp=10&sq=demog
raphics%20of%20gay%20rights%20issues&st=cse (reporting polls showing that 57
percent of respondents under 40 supported same-sex marriage, compared to 31 percent of
respondents over 40).
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Some elements of that freedom are well-protected by the Constitution, but others
are not. As in all political dramas, the timing of action will matter greatly. If the groups
supporting religious freedom on these issues hold out for complete victory over same-sex
marriage, and choose not to make some of the necessary compromises, those groups are
likely to get from legislatures no more protection of religious liberty than the Constitution
requires. If, however, the religion-based opposition can find ground of agreement with
the same-sex marriage movement – for instance, on the propositions that healthy, loving,
respected families of all kinds produce social benefits, and that a proper respect for
freedom to define, for religious purposes, the content of a virtuous life is essential to a
free society – a more expansive and stable modus vivendi seems entirely within the sweep
of politics’ art.
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